Along the way we discover, among other things: that despite himself Bill Clinton--via the loss of confidence in leaders and institutions engendered by the Lewinsky scandal--probably did more damage to the tolerance, trust and political engagement of the American public than any leader since Nixon; that the U.S. has consistently 'turned on itself', has persecuted difference and deviance within during times of political and economic turmoil; that death penalty sentencing by juries is so evidently driven by the same fearful forces as to qualify as a 'hate crime'; that the surprising popularity of the 'right-wing extremist' parties proliferating in the world's most avowedly tolerant nations is due not to especially high levels of authoritarianism but rather to the tremendous variance in public opinion made possible by its absence; and that the Serbs should never have been expected to live in peace with the other Yugoslav republics under anything less constrained than Tito's 'benevolent dictatorship'.
Another major theme developed throughout The Politics of Fear is that the notion of a general predisposition to intolerance of difference allows not just a more accurate, but a more optimistic assessment of the problems and opportunities common to diverse modern liberal democracies. Suppose that much expression of racial intolerance is driven primarily not by primitive racial animosity, but by some more fundamental, generalized intolerance of difference. To put it bluntly, those of different race can more easily change their seeming difference than their race, and certainly more easily than the inherently intolerant can change their predispositions. It appears that if different races and ethnicities within a nation could seem less different--whether by real or apparent increase in commonality of language, values or culture--then those who are innately intolerant of difference would generally be more 'tolerant' in effect (although in reality, of course, they remain persons who are no less intolerant but simply perceive they are confronting less difference). This only seems like a preposterous response to a persistent dilemma for liberal democracy, (and moreover, a deeply offensive one that appears to shift 'blame' for the problem, or at least responsibility for its solution, onto the victims), if we reject the notion of an inherent predisposition to intolerance of difference. While I am well aware of how discomfiting and objectionable many find such a proposition, I am able to offer good evidence in both books regarding the innate character of these predispositions.
In the end though, I contend that our resistance runs deeper than this, having much to do with cherished (and largely unexamined) beliefs we share regarding the supposed civilizing force of democracy: the purported educative function of experiencing and participating in a diverse, multi-cultural, liberal democracy. We tend to imagine, despite a preponderance of evidence, that everyone can be socialized away from intolerance toward greater respect for difference, if only we have the will, the resources, and the opportunity to provide the right experiences. According to this wishful understanding of reality, the different can remain as different as they like, and the intolerant will eventually have their intolerance educated out of them. But all the evidence I can muster indicates that exposure to difference, talking about difference, and applauding difference--the hallmarks of 'multicultural education'--are the surest ways to aggravate those who are innately intolerant, and guarantee the increased expression of their predispositions in manifestly intolerant attitudes and behaviors.